Foreword

Foreword

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Foreword

The 2020–2021 legislative session was one of the busiest legislative sessions on crime and punishment in recent memory. Much was accomplished. Much still needs to be tackled. Several significant criminal justice reform measures were passed:

● Abolishing the death penalty in Virginia;
● Authorizing judges to sentence a defendant after a jury trial, changing 224 years of precedent;
● Ending the presumption against bail;
● Authorizing parole eligibility and review for juvenile offenders;
● Preventing an individual from being arrested/prosecuted for purchasing/possessing a controlled substance after reporting an overdose to emergency services; 

● Prohibiting law enforcement/jail officers from strip searching minors;

● Enacting a police reform omnibus bill banning the use of chokeholds by law enforcement, requiring law enforcement to undergo training in de-escalation techniques, creating a duty to intervene if law enforcement officers witness misconduct by other officers, and banning no-knock-warrants;
● Expanding the authority of Civilian Review Boards in Virginia to investigate incidents of police misconduct, and giving the authority to issue subpoenas;

● Legalizing simple possession of marijuana;
● Creating degrees of robbery;
●Prohibiting vehicle searches based on the odor of marijuana;

● Requiring judges in criminal proceedings to take mental/emotional conditions into consideration;

● Allowing for automatic expungement of certain misdemeanors from criminal records and for individuals to petition circuit courts to have certain misdemeanor/felony convictions to be expunged;

● Allowing individuals to obtain a restricted driver’s license without paying court fines;

● Creating a Public Defender Office in Chesterfield County.

Joseph Giarratano*

*Mr. Giarratano spent thirteen years on Death Row in Virginia, where he served as a client advisor for the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons and as a member of the advisory board of the Center for Teaching Peace, Washington, D.C. His fight to avoid electrocution attracted the support of advocates as diverse as columnist James J. Kilpatrick and Amnesty International, many of whom argued that there is serious doubt as to Mr. Giarratano’s guilt. Mr. Giarratano has also attracted significant attention due to the innovative legal scholarship he has brought to his involvement in right-to-counsel and other death penalty related litigation, and to the articles he has published on Death Row issues.

 

 

In Memoriam: Clint Andrew Nichols

In Memoriam: Clint Andrew Nichols

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In Memoriam: Clint Andrew Nichols

Every year, the University of Richmond Law Review hosts a  symposium and publishes an accompanying issue of written work.  One rising third-year student volunteers as tribute to head up  both tasks. To succeed, the law student needs to exhibit excellence  in a number of ways that might be more “traditional” when it  comes to serving on the Law Review—timeliness, an eye for detail.  But the law student must be more—a politician of sorts, emceeing  an event that draws hundreds to the law school all the while connecting with a wide-range of personalities and individuals.  Clint Nichols fit the bill perfectly.  

A native of Winchester, Virginia, Clint graduated from Roanoke  College before moving to Washington, D.C., to begin a stint as a  staffer for the late United States Senator from Virginia, John W.  Warner. Not to be confined to the “world’s greatest deliberative  body,” he also served as an advance man on several presidential campaigns—for John McCain, for Mitt Romney, and for Marco  Rubio.  

In 2012, the outgoing board selected Clint to run the annual  symposium and direct the publication of the accompanying book.  Being a presidential year, it was only natural that Clint drew on  his background (and passion) in politics. Election Law: Beyond the  Red, Purple, and Blue was born.  

As for timeliness, one could hardly imagine a more appropriate  topic for that year.  

As for detail, he left none unaddressed. Indeed, in the last  minutes before the start of the symposium, Clint was furiously fashioning wire hangers to position perfectly the American flags in the backdrop of the panel. Betsy Ross would have been proud.  

As for the politician, that came naturally. From start to finish,  he commanded the panels that he moderated, glad-handed all the  guests, and made everyone with whom he interacted feel like the  most important person there.  

After a (brief) break from his duties, he successfully marshaled  to publication the symposium book just before our graduation in  the spring of 2013.  

In short, the Law Review and the University of Richmond School  of Law benefitted greatly from Clint’s service on the Volume 47  Executive Board.  

Those qualities he exhibited on the Executive Board propelled  him to professional success as well—first as a law clerk to United  States District Judge Henry E. Hudson, then as a partner at Han cock Daniel.  

While certainly proud of those accomplishments, he was most  proud of the accomplishments in his personal life. He constantly  (constantly) talked about his family. He made life-long friends everywhere he went. He volunteered his time to causes for the better ment of others.  

And he wanted to connect everyone he met along the way—no  matter how or when the relationship was forged. He wanted his  Roanoke College friends to meet his law school classmates—usu ally at Virginia Beach with a beverage in hand. He introduced his  law school classmates to his family—making the mistake of bringing them to his parents’ house for a birthday party where we  could see his baby pictures in all of their glory. And he wanted to  connect his family with those he met volunteering—going so far as  to make them one-in-the-same.  

Words can hardly express what the world has lost with Clint’s  untimely passing. He affected each of us in his own way. And each  of our lives was better for it.  

– Frank Talbott V

 

Thank You, Glenice!

Thank You, Glenice!

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Thank You, Glenice! 

 

Volume 56 would like to extend our warmest gratitude and appreciation to Glenice  B. Coombs, our Legal Publication Coordinator. Glenice has been an essential asset of  the University of Richmond Law Review for the past forty years, beginning with Volume 16 in 1981. As her chapter with Law Review comes to a close, it would be a  disservice not to pause and acknowledge Glenice’s endless dedication to Law Review’s  success, her unwavering commitment to excellence, and most importantly, the guidance and warmth that she brings to all who have had the pleasure of working along side her.  

The following Volumes of Law Review will miss Glenice’s eye for detail, inspiring  work ethic, and contagious laughter. It is people like Glenice that make the sleepless  nights of editing manuscripts worthwhile. From every member of Law Review, past  and present: thank you, Glenice! 

Preface

Preface

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Preface

 

The University of Richmond Law Review proudly presents the thirty-sixth issue of the Annual Survey of Virginia Law. Since 1985, the Annual Survey has been a guiding tool for practitioners and students to stay abreast of the recent legislative, judicial, and administrative developments in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Today, the Annual Survey is the most widely read publication of the Law Review, reaching lawyers, judges, legislators, and students in every corner of the Commonwealth.

In this issue, the Law Review is proud to commemorate the memory of Clint Nichols, the Symposium Editor for Law Review Volume 47. We are saddened by his loss and remain extremely thankful for his service and dedication to the Law Review and to the Richmond legal community.

This issue of the Annual Survey of Virginia Law contains six articles, each providing summaries of changes in the last year to substantive areas of the law. The topics of these thorough and well-written updates include Civil Practice and Procedure; Criminal Law and Procedure; Family Law; Juvenile Justice; Taxation; and Wills, Trusts, and Estates. Additionally, this issue contains a groundbreaking Essay which provides an overview and history of the abolition of the death penalty, and a thoughtful student Comment written by a University of Richmond Law Review staff member, which suggests an expansion to the boundaries of consumer protection in Virginia.

The enduring Annual Survey tradition is made possible only by the thoughtfulness and talent of our authors, many of whom contribute to the Annual Survey every year. Each piece is the culmination of expertise and sacrificed time in the name of legal scholarship. I am so grateful for these authors’ continued kindness and commitment to our publication. I cannot give enough thanks to Glenice Coombs for her never-ending dedication and kindness to the Law Review’s publication and staff. Glenice, your commitment, guidance, and generosity have been instrumental in getting us through the publication process, both emotionally and practically. I cannot imagine the Law Review without you, and we are forever in your debt.

I would also like to extend sincerest thanks to the Law Review staff for their careful editing and hard work. This summer and fall, in addition to continuing to work through a pandemic, legal internships, and other responsibilities, the Law Review staff poured over the following Articles for no compensation or academic credit to perfect the already incredible pieces.

To my fellow Executive Board members, thank you for your concerted effort in fine-tuning the details and putting this book together. I could not list one without the others, so to Chris Sullivan, thank you for your leadership and patience. To Mary Grace Whitten, thank you for your attention to detail and thoughtfulness. To Ren Warden, thank you for your editing expertise and your knowledge of Emperor Honorius’ bird. To Caroline Jaques, thank you for your humor, and for always finding the right word. To Maya Ravindran, thank you for your care and unwavering moral support. To Emily Fahey, thank you for your diligence and empathy. To Tesia Kempski, thank you for your infinite kindness and consideration. I am so grateful to have you all on my team.

Finally, thank you to my friends and family for helping to keep me (mostly) sane throughout this process. Your support and compassion has been such a blessing.

It has been an honor and pleasure to serve as Editor of the Annual Survey of Virginia Law. We hope this issue can serve as a valuable resource in your legal practice. Thank you for your continued readership and patronage. 

Andy V. O’Connell

Annual Survey Editor

COVID-19 and Rule 10B-5

COVID-19 and Rule 10B-5

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COVID-19 and Rule 10B-5

The COVID-19 pandemic presented wide-ranging challenges for businesses. Not the least of these is compliance with federal securities laws, including the prohibition—most notably under SEC Rule 10b-5—on materially deceptive statements made to the public. Both the SEC, in its role as enforcer of the law, and private parties, seeking to represent classes of aggrieved investors, have filed complaints asserting that corporations and others have engaged in deception of investors regarding matters pertaining to COVID-19. Some of these claims relate to disclosures regarding testing kits for the virus as well as development of vaccines. Other complaints allege faulty disclosure on the effect of the pandemic on the market for a company’s products and services that are not themselves related to the pandemic, such as claims against cruise lines that suspended operations.

This article presents the legal framework for claims based on Rule 10b-5, SEC guidance on how COVID-19 affects compliance with disclosure requirements for public companies, and the issues that have emerged in the claims already filed. This analysis demonstrates that almost any public reporting company faces the risk of inadequate disclosure and the temptation to withhold or misstate material facts in a time of financial stress.

*Allan Horwich

*Professor of Practice, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law (a-horwich@law.northweste rn.edu) and partner of Schiff Hardin LLP (ahorwich@schiffhardin.com). The views expressed in this article should not be attributed to any client of Schiff Hardin LLP. This article speaks as of February 18, 2021.

 

Appoint Candace Jackson-Akiwumi to the Seventh Circuit

Appoint Candace Jackson-Akiwumi to the Seventh Circuit

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Appoint Candace Jackson-Akiwumi to the Seventh Circuit

 

On November 30, Seventh Circuit Judge Joel Flaum assumed senior status when he completed over four decades of rigorous public service as a prominent jurist. On that day, the Senate resumed the prolonged lame duck session, which the GOP upper chamber majority began after voters had elected Joe Biden to replace former President Donald Trump. Trump correctly refrained from nominating Flaum’s successor. Four months later, President Biden dutifully announced that he would name Candace Jackson-Akiwumi to replace Flaum. Jackson-Akiwumi is a particularly qualified, mainstream nominee. Because she comprehensively answered senators’ complex, probing questions, and the Seventh Circuit lacks any people of color, the Senate must promptly confirm her.

 

*Carl Tobias

* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Jamie Wood for ideas, Leslee Stone for excellent processing, University of Richmond Law Review Editor-in-Chief Christopher Sullivan and Online Editor Tesia Kempski for expeditious, careful editing, as well as, Russell Williams and the Hunton Andrews Kurth Summer Endowment Research Fund for generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are mine.

 

 

Rethinking Music Copyright Infringement in the Digital World: Proposing a Streamlined Test After the Demise of the Inverse Ratio Rule

Rethinking Music Copyright Infringement in the Digital World: Proposing a Streamlined Test After the Demise of the Inverse Ratio Rule

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Introduction

I simply cannot copy your song if I have never heard it before. In a hypothetical world in which I truly had no exposure to your musical composition, any eerie similarities between our two songs must necessarily be the product of our own individual imaginations. Indeed, copyright law protects such independent creation. Determining that one song was copied from another, therefore, requires two things: that the songs be “too” similar, whatever that means, and that the second author have had some kind of access to the first author’s work. In reality, however, songs can only be so similar before a rational person will start to suspect that one songwriter must have had access to the other songwriter’s work—even if that access cannot be proven. When the similarity between two songs is high enough, we begin to infer access even in the absence of evidence. On the other hand, however, if the songs are only mildly similar, we typically demand more proof of access before we are willing to chastise the second author for copying.

This inference gives rise to the now largely defunct inverse ratio rule—a three-word phrase that struck fear into the hearts of musicians within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While seemingly logical, the inverse ratio rule created three untenable situations; each resulted in deeming a song “copied,” which, most artists would likely agree, is a badge of shame. In the first, one songwriter could be found liable for copying—even in a song which bore little similarity to the supposed original—when a high amount of access to that supposed original could be shown. In the second, a song could be slapped with the “copied” stamp when it shared significant similarity with another, despite the songwriter having little access to the supposed original, because of the satisfaction of the inverse ratio rule—a conclusion that seems to fly in the face of copyright’s supposed protection of independent creation. This scenario is often referred to as “subconscious copying.” Finally, the rule deemed “copied” songs that innocently drew on the inspiration of, or paid overt homage to, the work of another musician—an incredibly common phenomenon that artists have described as paying tribute to the “legacy” of influential musicians.

In the face of such a bewildering rule, I might stop publishing songs altogether. After all, if I face a copyright lawsuit every time I compose—given that I have heard a wide array of songs in my lifetime—I may very well decide the risk is not worth the reward. I may derive my deepest joy from songwriting, but since I do not have $5 million to pay your damages award, prudence dictates I remain silent.

This is the landscape song composers faced after a surprise 2015 verdict, in which a California jury found that Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams had infringed the copyright of Marvin Gaye’s Got to Give It Up with their smash hit, Blurred Lines—the bestselling single in the world in 2013. Despite the fact that the two songs share little musical similarity—at least in the opinion of the music industry—the courts hit Thicke and Williams with a $5.3 million payout, along with fifty percent of royalties generated by their song.

On appeal, when two members of a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel did not find enough reason to overturn the jury’s verdict, panic set in. The music community shared the opinion of Judge Jacqueline Nguyen, who in a spirited dissent argued that the majority had allowed for copyrighting of a musical style. “[B]y refusing to compare the two works,” Judge Nguyen wrote, “the majority establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future musicians and composers everywhere.”

This Comment will discuss the devastating blow to musicians inflicted by the Blurred Lines verdict’s embrace of the inverse ratio rule. Then, I will examine the Stairway to Heaven decision, in which the Ninth Circuit sharply changed course and decided to abrogate the inverse ratio rule. This welcome policy change nevertheless leaves questions as to how the Ninth Circuit will balance considerations of access with substantial similarity as it assesses copying in future cases. More importantly, the explosion of access in the digital world has fatally weakened—across all circuits—the role of access within the infringement test. In that light, I will conclude with a modified standard by which music copyright infringement cases should be judged. 

*Christina Dimeo

*J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A. with Distinction, 2004, University of Virginia. I would like to thank the members of the University of Richmond Law Review for their tireless efforts in preparing this Comment for publication, and Professor Chris Cotropia for his spot-on suggestions pushing me to dig deeper. I am also grateful to Dave Schmidle for hours of enthusiastic discussion that allowed me to sharpen and refine my proposed music copyright infringement test, and for his invaluable assistance in creating electronic versions of my diagrams. Most of all, I would like to thank my children, Anthony, Sammy, and Anneliese, for their love, support, and continued patience as I “do my homework.”

 

Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy

Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy

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Introduction

Concerns about drones and their impact on privacy are misplaced. Most of the scenarios discussed in the academic literature and policy commentary simply assume that drones operate in a unique way. These discussions of drones and privacy have left the antecedent question unexamined—precisely how do drones impact privacy? This Article is the first to clearly define the operational parameters of drones that impact privacy in a unique way. From this precise definition, we learn that drones operate in very few spaces that allow them to capture data inaccessible to other technologies. In short, how drones operate has a limited impact on privacy.

*David Sella-Villa

 *Interim Chief Privacy Officer, South Carolina Department of Administration, focusing on technology, privacy, and security issues; CIPP/US, CIPP/E, CIPM, and GLEG certifications; Adjunct Professor, William & Mary Law School, aviation law class. J.D., William & Mary Law School; Editor-in-Chief, Environmental Law and Policy Review; M.S., London School of Economics; B.S. & B.A., West Virginia University.

 

How to Do Things with Signs: Semiotics in Legal Theory, Practice, and Education

How to Do Things with Signs: Semiotics in Legal Theory, Practice, and Education

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Introduction

Discussing federal statutes, Justice Scalia tells us that “[t]he stark reality is that the only thing that one can say for sure was agreed to by both houses and the president (on signing the bill) is the text of the statute. The rest is legal fiction.” 

How should we take this claim? If we take “text” to mean the printed text, that text without more is just a series of marks. Agreement on a series of marks without more has no meaning in itself. In struggling with Justice Scalia’s remarks, we thus must ask whether on the face of these remarks he has committed the fallacy of conflating signifiers of meaning with meaning itself. Legislators do not agree simply on certain ink marks but on what they believe those ink marks signify. Their duty is to legislate, not to produce mere marks of ink.

If we instead take “text” to embody something off the page, such as the “meaning” of the series of marks at issue, what is that meaning and how do we know that all the legislators “agreed” on that “meaning”? The series of marks itself cannot prove such unanimity, much less any specific meaning. Even if we take such off-the-page text as referring to words with standard or dictionary meanings, we know that words have multiple such meanings (“left,” for example, can mean, among other things, a direction or the past tense of “leave”). A series of marks referring to a series of words in itself thus does not tell us which standard meanings were in the heads of legislators when they read (if they did) drafts of the bill.

This Article therefore broadly explores semiotics through a lawyer’s lens, hopefully simplifying as much as possible much of the complex, divergent, and, frankly, sometimes baffling terminology used by those who explore semiotics. This Article will first continue below with a general definition of signs and the related notion of intentionality. It will then address the structure and concomitants of signs, the nature of speech acts that are of interest to lawyers, the sign classifications used in legal analysis and rhetoric, the role of signs in careful legal thought and good legal rhetoric, the unfolding of the signified and the fixation of mean- ing debate, the semiotics of speaker vs. reader meaning, and some brief reflections on semiotics and the First Amendment. Finally, this Article also provides an Appendix with further terms and concepts helpful to lawyers exploring semiotics.

I hope this Article’s broad overview of semiotics underscores the vital importance of semiotics in law and in legal education reform. I also hope this Article inspires readers and legal education reformers to explore the vast worlds of semiotics that elude the page constraints of a general overview.

 

*Harold Lloyd

*Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law

How the Conflict Between Anti-Boycott Legislation and the Expressive Rights of Business Endangers Civil Rights and Antidiscrimination Laws

How the Conflict Between Anti-Boycott Legislation and the Expressive Rights of Business Endangers Civil Rights and Antidiscrimination Laws

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Introduction

More so perhaps than at any time in recent American history, social and political activists are calling for boycotts of people, products, and even states and nations as a way to bring about change. The tactic has been particularly visible during the years of polarization following the 2016 presidential election and has continued during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. As in the past, the promoters of boycotts span the political spectrum. Among the most prominent boycotts during the last several years has been the attempt to isolate Israel through the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement (commonly known as “BDS”). This movement—and the attempts to combat it—have created a near-perfect storm of competing rights and values that encapsulates one of the great contradictions in contemporary American society: the conflict between personal freedoms and efforts to end bigoted and discriminatory behavior by commercial businesses.

This Article examines how opponents of anti-BDS laws may extend First Amendment rights in the business context to a point at which they actually threaten the validity of much antidiscrimination legislation. Part I discusses the BDS movement and state-based initiatives that attempt to penalize businesses that actively engage in a boycott of Israel. It examines the handful of cases in which federal courts have addressed the constitutionality of laws that require state contractors to affirm that they are not actively boycotting that country. Part II transitions to a discussion of the ways the Supreme Court has historically resolved conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and the constitutional rights of freedom of association and expression, and notes a transition from deference to enforcement of such laws to a recognition of the expressive rights of individuals and groups in both noncommercial and commercial contexts. The Article concludes in Part III with an application of the existing jurisprudence to state anti-BDS laws and highlights the dangers that successful opposition to such laws might present to the continued viability of antidiscrimination laws.
It concludes that affirmation of the expressive rights of pro-BDS businesses could lead to serious challenges to the constitutionality of laws designed to prevent bigotry in the conduct of commercial
affairs—including the landmark civil rights laws of the 1960s.

*Debbie Kaminer

**David Rosenberg

 *Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College (CUNY). J.D., Columbia
University School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. This Article greatly benefitted
from discussion with colleagues at the 2019 Annual Academy of Legal Studies in Business Conference and with participants on the panel “Anti-Boycott Legislation and the Expressive Rights of Businesses: The Ethics and Legality of State Laws that Combat the BDS Movement,” hosted by the Robert Zicklin Center for Corporate Integrity in April 2020. All errors are our own.

**Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Robert Zicklin Center for Corporate
Integrity, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College (CUNY).