Thomas DiStanislao, III *
Ann Elizabeth Reid **
This year, the University of Richmond Law Review observes its Golden Anniversary with the publication of its fiftieth volume. We take this opportunity to look back over our journal’s history, to celebrate its many successes, and to honor and thank all those who have contributed to both the evolution and the survival of this Law Review over the last several decades.
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* Editor-in-Chief, Volume 50.
** Lead Articles Editor, Volume 50.
Hamilton Bryson *
J. Rodney Johnson, Professor of Law, Emeritus, of the University of Richmond, was one of the preeminent legal scholars of wills and testamentary trusts in Virginia. He was born in the Oak Grove section of Richmond, Virginia, on July 9, 1939, into a devout Baptist family, of which he was one of five sons.
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* Blackstone Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. LL.D., 2013, University of Cambridge; Ph.D., 1972, University of Cambridge; LL.M., 1968, University of Virginia School of Law; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1963, Hampden-Sydney College.
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg *
As Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 turns fifty,[1] many employers continue to search for effective ways to integrate its rights-based antidiscrimination mandates into the practical realities of managing an organization. Title VII and related laws[2] have two core purposes. The “primary objective” is an antidiscrimination or egalitarian goal: “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove” discriminatory barriers in the workplace.[3] In the words of one federal court, Title VII aimed “to liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment.”[4]
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* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center for Dispute Resolution, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I am grateful for the restorative justice practitioners who shared their wisdom and experiences, including Dr. Lauren Abramson, Kay Pranis, Beth Alosi, Tracy Roberts, and Leigh Ann Roberts, as well as my colleagues at the Center for Dispute Resolution: Barbara Sugarman Grochal, Toby Treem Guerin, and Anastasia Smith. I also thank the scholars who commented on the idea and previous drafts, including Michael Fischl, Elayne Greenberg, Maxwell Stearns, Martha Ertman, Leigh Goodmark, and other faculty at Maryland Carey Law, the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, the AALS ADR Section Works-in-Progress Conference, and the Law & Society Conference. Kerishe Allen, Jenny Rensler, Charles Pipins, and Susan McCarty provided excellent research and citation assistance.
[1]. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). President Lyndon Johnson signed Title VII into law on July 2, 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
[2]. Other employment discrimination laws include, for example: the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).
[3]. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
[4]. King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Jacqueline Fox *
Healthcare reform is not a singular event, but instead is a constant process that will continue into the foreseeable future. This article proposes a creative solution to the acrimonious and debilitating method we currently use in assessing and implementing healthcare reform proposals.
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* Associate Professor, Health Law and Bioethics, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. The author was a post-doctoral Greenwall Fellow in Health Policy and Bioethics and a Yale University Donaghue Visiting Scholar of Research Ethics. The author would like to thank Seth Stoughton, Ann M. Marciarille, and Alex Ruskell for their comments and Ryan Adams and Tony R. Johnson for their work as research assistants. This project was presented in an earlier form at the Health Law Professors Conference in San Francisco in 2014, and the author would like to thank the attendees for their excellent comments.
Cody Gray *
Lorna Francis is an African American woman who lives in Conyers, Georgia, a quiet city southeast of Atlanta.[1] She is a hairdresser and single mother, and has little time for anything else.[2] Politics is something of an afterthought for Lorna: “Life’s been busy—I’ve been trying to make that money.”[3] So she was not surprised to learn she had missed the most recent mayoral election: “[H]onestly, I only vote in major elections.”[4]
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* Ph.D., 2015, Politics, Princeton University; J.D., 2015, Harvard Law School. I thank Chuck Cameron, Jeanne Charn, Susan Davies, Paul Frymer, Claire Johnson, J. Morgan Kousser, Uzoma Nkwonta, Susannah Barton Tobin, Keith Whittington, and seminar participants at Harvard Law School for advice. All errors are my own.
[1]. The proceeding discussion is adapted from Richard Fausset’s helpful description of Conyers. See Richard Fausset, Mostly Black Cities, Mostly White City Halls, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2014, at A1.
[2]. Id.
[3]. Id.
[4]. See id.
Michael Kagan *
President Obama has made executive action and prosecutorial discretion his signature contributions to immigration policy. His aim has been to focus enforcement against immigrants caught at the border or with criminal records while easing the path toward integration for others.[1] These actions—a collection of policies that use discretion to improve the legal standing of millions of unauthorized immigrants or at least shield them from arrest and deportation—may benefit as many as 87% of the unauthorized immigrants in the United States.[2]
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* Associate Professor at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. This article benefited from insights and feedback from Jill E. Family, Hiroshi Motomura, and David Rubenstein. All errors are mine.
[1]. See generally Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy of Discretion: Refining the Legality Debate About Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1083 (2015) (describing President Obama’s immigration policy reforms); Jerry Markon, Obama Administration Scales Back Deportations in Policy Shift, Wash. Post (July 2, 2015), https: //www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-scales-back-deportations-aims-to-integrate-illegal-immigrants-into-society/2015/07/02/890960d2-1b56-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html (discussing President Obama’s immigration policy shift toward integration).
[2]. Julia Preston, Most Undocumented Immigrants Will Stay Under Obama’s New Policies, Report Says, N.Y. Times (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/us/ politics/most-undocumented-immigrants-will-stay-under-obamas-new-policies-report-says. html. The Obama Administration has made it clear that those people granted deferred action will also receive employment authorization, which, in addition to allowing a person to be legally employed, facilitates obtaining Social Security numbers and other benefits. See Frequently Asked Questions: DACA and Your Workplace Rights, Nat’l Immigration L. Ctr. (July 15, 2015), https://nilc.org/dacaworkplacerights.html. Beyond deferred action, President Obama’s Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has announced the criteria it uses to decide whether to prioritize non-citizens for deportation (or non-deportation), which has the potential to allow many unlawfully present immigrants to know in advance whether they are likely to be pursued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), even if they are not formally granted deferred action. See Markon, supra note 1.