Caleb C. Briggs *

* J.D., 2024, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2020, University of Virginia.

The wheels of justice move slowly. There is usually a significant lapse of time between the underlying factual events prompting a dispute, the filing of a lawsuit, and an ultimate judgment. During this significant temporal lag, it is not uncommon for parties to a dispute to move to a new state and establish a new domicile. This move can complicate a choice of law analysis. Modern choice of law heavily emphasizes the domicile of the parties to a dispute. But which domicile counts: The pre-move or post-move domicile of the litigant? The black letter law has always assumed that the postmove domicile—the “after-acquired” domicile—does not count for choice of law purposes. But there are some cases that do consider the after-acquired domicile when doing a choice of law analysis. This Article examines the after-acquired domicile problem and offers a comprehensive solution to the issue.

Luke Meier *

* Professor of Law, Baylor Law School.

As the only agency charged with enforcing the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s antidiscrimination provisions, the Immigrant and Employee Rights (“IER”) section of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division plays an important role in protecting worker rights. Yet over the past decade, IER has moved from worker protection to immigration enforcement: a phenomenon this Article terms “immigration enforcement creep.”

This observation is based on ten years of data collected from IER’s settlement agreements, complaints filed, and telephone interventions. The data show that rather than protect noncitizen workers from unlawful discrimination, IER has moved its focus to enforcing immigration laws against employers who hire workers on temporary work visas. IER’s enforcement choices lead to underenforcement of the antidiscrimination provisions Congress charged it with enforcing. This Article ultimately concludes that this immigration enforcement creep goes against IER’s role as a worker protection agency and suggests principles of equitable enforcement that should guide its exercise of authority instead.

Angela D. Morrison *

* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. 

Americans are infatuated with the stock markets, and today’s stock markets are dominated by a small number of large institutions that manage enormous amounts of money. Those two facts are paradoxical given the history of stock markets in the United States. Modern stock markets in the United States are the consequence of federal legislation responding to widespread social and economic harm caused by the stock market crash of 1929. That legislation was designed to avoid the concentration of economic power in a small number of institutions. Despite those historical facts, over the past century, the centrality of the stock markets in the U.S. economy has steadily grown, and a handful of enormous institutions have come to manage an outsized portion of the money in those markets.

This Article explores the historical choices and forces that led us to this point. It describes the cultural and political forces that led U.S. lawmakers to favor market financing, at first reluctantly, but eventually unabashedly. It catalogs federal lawmaking around the securities markets over the near century between 1929 and today. This review of lawmaking uncovers how, over this time, lawmakers’ affinity for markets strengthened as their skepticism of institutions disappeared. It concludes that once policymaking embraced the capital markets, the development of investment intermediaries was
all but inevitable.

Emily Winston *

* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.