Facebook has become central to the lives of millions of Americans. As of 2021, 69% of U.S. adults use Facebook. Among those U.S. adults who use Facebook, roughly 70% visit Facebook at least once a day. Moreover, as of 2020, 36% of U.S. adults receive their news through Facebook. That means roughly 60 million U.S. adults receive their news through Facebook each day. Facebook’s impact on American society cannot be overstated when viewed through such a lens. Thus, it is important to ensure Facebook responsibly designs its products: its platform and its algorithms.

Grant Shea

J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Richmond School of Law

Fractured public land is hidden in plain sight. In communities across the country, a patchwork assortment of local governments share splintered ownership over surplus public properties, which can be found scattered in residential neighborhoods and alongside highways, in the shadows of development projects and in the scars of urban renewal. The ripple effect of this fragmentation extends across the spectrum of local governance. It creates needless costs and bureaucratic headaches at a time of acute fiscal distress for cities and counties. It contributes to an inequitable imbalance of local power between formal and informal landowners in a community. And curiously, the operative legal regime enables the problem while simultaneously muddying pragmatic ways to confront it. This Article seeks to shed light upon the local land checkerboard— and in doing so, the cluttered and opaque world of local government law that it inhabits

Daniel B. Rosenbaum

Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law

Many facets of utility monopoly regulation are approaching a minimum of eight decades as part of our legal landscape. A bedrock principle of state utility regulation is the duty to serve, which demands that utilities provide nondiscriminatory service to all those within their geographic territory for the specific service for which they have been granted a monopoly. Within its exclusive territory, a utility is required “to serve all present and reasonably to be anticipated future users.” Each state has adopted some form of this for its regulated monopolies, although formulations differ. This Article argues that in light of climate change impacts, the duty to serve must change.

Heather Payne

Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law

With a few caveats, standard economic models assume that, from society’s perspective, the payment of a tax constitutes a costless transfer from the taxpayer to the government. The financial loss to the taxpayer is exactly offset by the financial gain to the government, which can use the resulting tax revenue for the benefit of its citizens. In other words, paying taxes forces taxpayers to forgo private consumption, but the resulting loss in utility can be counterbalanced by an increase in utility from government spending. In fact, if the government spends wisely on beneficial public goods that are undersupplied by private markets, then the taxand-transfer system can produce a net gain in utility that increases social welfare.

Gary M. Lucas, Jr.

Senior Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law

Last spring, the Supreme Court of the United States made a little-remarked constitutional ruling in Kahler v. Kansas. Upon casual inspection, Kahler looks like a doctrinal dead-end. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to recognize a due process right for mentally ill defendants to raise the M’Naghten right-and-wrong test of insanity, and the Court said, “No.” The petitioner’s failure notwithstanding, Kahler is not a barren vine. On the contrary, it is heavy-laden with new doctrinal insights for criminal law scholars.

The case deserves a thorough look—not for what it can teach us about constitutional contentions that the Court has rendered unviable for the foreseeable future—but for what the creative arguments written by the petitioner’s attorneys can teach us about criminal law. Specifically, the briefing in Kahler unmasks a cached moral blameworthiness requirement in criminal law doctrine, on the same plane as the canonical requirements of voluntariness, action, and mens rea, but buried over the last two centuries in the rules governing the insanity defense.

Andrew Ingram

Scholar in Residence, South Texas College of Law