Introduction
When courts imply a cause of action under a Bivens analysis and when they apply an immunity as a defense, they are acting in their capacity as common-law courts. However, each of those mechanisms developed differently, and the Supreme Court of the United States has been hesitant to utilize one—Bivens causes of action—while generously applying the other—qualified immunity. The purposes behind each device were originally antithetical, with Bivens aiming to deter unconstitutional conduct and qualified immunity seeking to ensure courts did not deter too much. However, the Supreme Court gradually restricted its Bivens jurisprudence, from granting a cause of action unless there are “special factors,” to denying a cause of action whenever there are “sound reasons.” As a result, the practical outcomes of both analyses are the same: plaintiffs cannot fully vindicate their constitutional rights and often cannot vindicate them at all. This Comment argues that, to ensure the vitality of the foundational presumption that for every legal right, there is a remedy, the Supreme Court should restore its Bivens analysis to the original framework, invoking only those “special factors” recognized in the Court’s initial extensions of a cause of action to plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims.