THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE DANGER OF THE NEW URBAN MIGRATION

Richard Sander *

ABSTRACT

Twenty-first century America is witnessing a broad and unprecedented migration of middle- and upper-middle class families to old, dense, and often low-income urban neighborhoods. This “new urban migration” has the potential to create wholly gentrified neighborhoods that displace existing residents, or to engender racially and economically integrated neighborhoods that strengthen both neighborhoods and central cities. I argue that valuable lessons can be learned from the 1970s, when another large intraurban migration—the vast metropolitan movement of black households into white neighborhoods that followed passage of the Fair Housing Act—produced patterns of resegregation in many cities, but genuine housing integration in others. We now understand what conditions in the 1970s produced resegregative or integrative outcomes. I show that so far, the new urban migration has mostly fostered integration, but that careful, proactive policies that help to disperse this migration can make good long-term outcomes much more likely.

INTRODUCTION

Should urban residents and fair housing advocates welcome gentrification, or fear it? Is it a gentle wave breathing new vitality and a measure of affluence into old neighborhoods, or a steamroller pushing out everything in its path?

Gentrification is intensely controversial because it has the potential to be either of these things.¹ The broader pattern of white

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¹ For a useful compendium of contrasting views and interpretations of gentrification,
and middle-class migration to urban cores is one of the most significant demographic trends currently underway in the United States. Capturing the good effects of this trend while avoiding its harmful effects is probably the most important policy issue facing urban leaders. If we get it right, the demographic energy represented by this migration can significantly reduce urban segregation and improve outcomes for all. If we get it wrong, we may see a replay of past tragedies.

But in a society where African American segregation is so severe, do we even know how to foster integration on a large scale? Increasingly, we do. Starting in the 1970s, a relative handful of metropolitan areas have experienced broad and sustained black-white desegregation. And recent research by Yana Kucheva and myself has shed light on why, how, and where desegregation occurred. Understanding what happened in the 1970s and 1980s, during an era of large-scale black migration into white communities, turns out to shed considerable light on how to successfully manage the large-scale migration of whites and middle-class minorities today into urban cores.

This article undertakes three tasks. First, I describe the key outlines of how segregation changed in the 1970s, and how large-scale black migration often led mainly to wide resegregation, but how in some metro areas, it led to sustained and beneficial declines in segregation. Second, I provide a broad overview of what I call the “new urban migration”—the migration of whites and middle-class minorities into dense urban neighborhoods that are often, when immigration begins, predominantly minority and low-income. Third, I discuss the sorts of policies that build both on our current understanding of the new urban migration, and our lessons from the 1970s and 1980s, to suggest how we can make current trends work to produce sustainably integrated neighborhoods. In this last part, I often refer readers to Professor Olatunde Johnson’s contribution

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2. See infra Figure 2. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution, causes, and consequences of housing segregation in the United States, which provides more detailed discussions of many points raised summarily here, see RICHARD H. SANDER ET AL., MOVING TOWARD INTEGRATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING passim (Harvard Univ. Press 2018).

to this Symposium, which valuably explores in much more detail the possible legal and policy responses to gentrification.

I. A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

I use the term “new urban migration” to describe the net migration of non-Hispanic whites (who I will sometimes call “Anglos” to distinguish them from white Hispanics) and middle-class minorities to relatively dense urban neighborhoods. As we shall see, both of these migrations have accelerated since the turn of the twenty-first century. The migration of whites includes not only affluent professionals, but a much broader cross-section of the Anglo community. Often but not always, the dense neighborhoods to which Anglos move also attract middle-class African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. In some of my analyses, I will use Anglos to stand in for the broader migration simply for ease of analysis and exposition.

The word “gentrification” is widely used by everyone who works on urban issues (including me), but it is a value-laden term, implying to many a process of appropriation and displacement. But as much research shows, and as I shall try to make clear below, the new urban migration really does have benign forms. A key goal in this piece is to help us distinguish how to maximize the “good” forms of this migration, and avoid or mitigate the “bad” forms.

II. UNDERSTANDING WHAT HAPPENED IN THE 1970S

A. Fair Housing and the Increase in Black Mobility

Almost everyone knows about the Great Migration, in which some six million African Americans moved from the rural South to the urban North, South, and West between World War I and the end of the 1960s.¹ But few know about the vast intraurban and

¹ For powerful accounts of the Great Migration at both a family and national level, see Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (1991) (recounting the intertwining life stories of several African Americans who, after the introduction of the cotton picker and other technology that transformed the sharecropping system they were a part of, migrated from Clarksdale, Mississippi, to Chicago, Illinois); and Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration (2010) (telling the story of three southern African Americans who each migrated to northern urban areas to escape racial discrimination in the late thirties to early fifties).
interurban black migrations of the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1980, over four million African Americans moved into housing units previously occupied by whites. Intermetropolitan movers migrated from one metropolitan area to another; intrametropolitan black movers exited usually all black neighborhoods, sometimes entering adjacent white areas and sometimes moving many miles to suburbs. It was, and remains, the largest such migration to happen within a single decade. Understanding how these migrations played out in the 1970s provides valuable clues to thinking about the new urban migration. It is also a crucial and often misunderstood episode in the development of fair housing and the evolution of black-white segregation.

In April 1968, Congress passed and Lyndon Johnson signed the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). Although its proponents made significant concessions to get the law passed, the FHA nonetheless was a powerful law, vigorously enforced by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") during the 1970s and broadly interpreted by the courts. By the time Congress passed the FHA, more than twenty states had passed fair housing laws of their own, some of them as early as 1959. But these laws were generally quite narrow, had limited enforcement mechanisms, and led to few lawsuits. Careful studies suggest that they had minimal effect on levels of discrimination or upon black mobility. In contrast, the DOJ undertook literally hundreds of enforcement actions in the early 1970s, often targeting the largest housing actors in major metropolitan areas. The strategy at the DOJ was to prosecute some cases through to a decision,

7. See id. at 168.
11. See Sander et al., supra note 2, at 124.
13. See Zasloff, Between Resistance and Embrace, supra note 9, at 70, 80–83.
often followed by an appellate decision broadly interpreting the FHA, while in a large majority of cases, the DOJ pressed for consent decrees that required defendants to stop discrimination and undertake a variety of “best practices” for fair housing.14 Private fair housing groups around the country—such as the remarkable Leadership Council in Chicago—complemented the DOJ’s work with hundreds of other cases.15

The federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) was comparatively sluggish during this period, not making full use even of its limited powers under the FHA. HUD was authorized to, and should have, undertaken a careful national study of housing discrimination in 1969;16 in the event, it did not do so until 1977.17 The 1977 study used fair housing groups around the country to administer fair housing “tests,” in which pairs of testers, one white and one black, would be matched along various nonracial characteristics and then sent into the field to inquire after advertised housing units.18 Sometimes units would go off the market between the two tester visits, so both black and white testers were sometimes told units were unavailable for apparently nondiscriminatory reasons.19 The “net” rate at which African Americans experienced discrimination in housing availability was 27% in the rental market and 15% in the sales market.20

Although we lack an earlier, similarly careful national study, many local groups undertook “testing” studies from the late 1950s through the late 1960s.21 Through 1968, these studies consistently showed extraordinarily high discrimination rates in white markets where racial transition was not already underway.22 Testers usually encountered blanket policies against providing service to African Americans.23 When these studies produced data that can be

15. See id. at 156–57.
18. Id. at ES-3 to -4.
19. Sander et al., supra note 2, at 162.
20. Wienk et al., supra note 17, at 59–60, 123.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 128, 164.
reasonably compared to the HUD’s 1977 study, the discrimination rates in the 1960s were generally at or above 90%.24

After the first national study, HUD commissioned new national studies at intervals of ten to twelve years. These tests—conducted in 1989, 2000, and 2012—became gradually more ambitious, adding first Hispanic-Anglo tests and then Asian-Anglo tests, measuring more types of market behavior, and capturing neighborhood characteristics.25 On the broad, simple measure that can be most directly compared with the 1977 audits, these subsequent studies charted further declines in the “net” rate of availability discrimination against black testers.26

Figure 1. Net Availability Rates of Discrimination Encountered by African Americans in Fair Housing Audits, 1965–201227

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24. See id. at chs. 5–6.


26. See infra Figure 1.

27. The square-marked line is a measure of net discrimination against African Americans asking about the availability of housing units in the rental market; the circle-marked line is the comparable figure for the sales market. Data was taken from the following sources: the 1965 data was taken from Sander et al., supra note 2, at 128–20, 164; the 1977 data was taken from Wienk et al., supra note 17, at ES-2; and the 1989–2012 data was taken from sources cited supra note 25.
We should not conclude from this chart that housing discrimination was vanquished in the 1970s or thereafter. It persisted, and persists, often taking forms too subtle to be captured by the straightforward testing techniques developed in the 1960s and 1970s. But fair housing scholars often make the opposite mistake and fail to recognize that almost universal practices of housing discrimination became fragmented and decentralized in the 1970s, and hundreds of neighborhoods across the country that had been effectively closed to blacks before the FHA were now “open” in a meaningful way.\textsuperscript{28}

There are several ways we can document the fundamental shift in black migration that occurred after 1970. First, there is the sheer scale of movement into white neighborhoods—which, as we noted, was in the 1970s the highest on record.\textsuperscript{29} Second, this migration was more dispersed than in the past. African Americans had been moving into white neighborhoods at an accelerating rate since the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in \textit{Shelley v. Kraemer}.\textsuperscript{30} But black migration in the 1948–1970 era was almost always into blocks directly adjacent to existing African American neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{31} It was often facilitated by “blockbusters,” real estate agents frightening whites into selling their housing, and then selling at a premium to black buyers.\textsuperscript{32} In the 1970s, however, a large share of black pioneering occurred in neighborhoods many miles from predominantly black neighborhoods—a shift which, as we shall see, had the potential for momentous consequences.\textsuperscript{33}

To help quantify this shift, Table 1 breaks metropolitan census tracts into three categories. “Core” black neighborhoods are those census tracts which, in each census year, were at least 50% African American. “Border” neighborhoods are tracts within two miles of a core neighborhood, and “outlying” neighborhoods are those at least two miles from a core tract. This classification is crude; the size of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
\item \textsuperscript{31} See Kucheva & Sander, \textit{supra} note 30, at 215, 219, 224.
\item \textsuperscript{32} See id. at 213, 215, 222, 225.
\item \textsuperscript{33} See infra Table 1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
tracts, for example, varied widely across cities. But even so, it is clear enough from Table 1 that between 1970 and 1980, a big jump occurred in the propensity (and, I would argue, ability) of blacks to move to outlying tracts. This was especially true for African Americans moving from another metro area—that is, “newcomers” to a given metro area. By 1980, these newcomers were as likely to move to an outlying neighborhood as to either a “core” or “border” area.

Table 1. Distribution of African American Moves in All United States Metropolitan Areas Across Three Zones by Newcomer Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>SMSA Incumbents</th>
<th>SMSA Newcomers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–1960</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1970</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1980</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–1990</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another way to chart this change is to identify the “ whitest half” of all census tracts in a metropolitan area, and track the number of African Americans living in such tracts over time. In Chicago, a total of only 231 African Americans in 1970 lived in these several hundred nearly all-white tracts; by 1980, the number had risen to 2073, and by 1990, it was 5922. In Detroit, the number rose from 0 in 1970 to 273 in 1980 and 1319 by 1990. The rises were less dramatic in the South, where even heavily white areas had many black live-in domestics, but nationally the number of African Americans in these heavily white tracts quadrupled in the 1970s and doubled again in the 1980s.

Not surprisingly, the 1970s also brought the first declines in measured African American segregation in the twentieth century. A common and straightforward measure of black-white segregation is the index of dissimilarity, which measures the share of one group (e.g., whites) who would need to move into a neighborhood

34. Calculations were conducted by Yana Kucheva and the author using restricted data from the Decennial Census.

35. The numbers in this paragraph are calculated by the author from the NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE DATABASE, supra note 5.
with a higher share of another group (e.g., blacks) to achieve the same racial shares in all neighborhoods. If a metro area is, for example, 20% black, then the index of dissimilarity is “1” if no blacks live in the same neighborhood as any white (i.e., complete apartheid) and “0” if every neighborhood is 20% black. 36 When measured at a high level of resolution—that is to say, blocks—the black-white index of dissimilarity in 1970 averaged 0.93 across sixty major metropolitan areas, with a standard deviation of 0.03. 37 These numbers were very static across all five censuses from 1930 through 1970, and they meant, of course, that something very close to apartheid existed.

Between 1970 and 1980, the black-white, block-level index of dissimilarity in these sixty metro areas dropped from 0.93 to 0.81. 38 This was a modest decline compared to drops in measured discrimination, and certainly not enough to fundamentally change opportunities for African Americans in most urban areas. But just as significantly, the standard deviation of dissimilarity nearly tripled, from 0.03 to 0.08. This meant that segregation, which had looked very much the same everywhere in 1970, by 1980 looked very different in some metro areas than others. By 1990, eight metro areas had black-white dissimilarity indices below 0.70. 39 In these areas, segregation was still high compared to levels experienced by, say, Jewish Americans or Chinese Americans, but it was dramatically different from what it had been in 1970 and the continuing trend of black-white segregation in those areas was toward further decline. 40

36. See Sander et al., supra note 2, at 37–38.
37. See infra Figure 2.
38. See infra Figure 2.
39. See infra Figure 2.
40. Sander et al., supra note 2, at 103.
Conversely, many urban areas—including most of the areas with the largest black populations, such as New York City, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland—saw comparatively tiny declines in black-white segregation in the 1970s.\(^{42}\) In Chicago, the index dropped only four percentage points; in New York City, only one.\(^{43}\) The glacial pace of desegregation in these areas set the pace for decades to follow; in 2010, indices in many of our major metro areas are still above 0.80.\(^{44}\)

This divergence in patterns of housing segregation has attracted increasing attention from social scientists in recent years,\(^{45}\) and I believe we now understand much of what drove these patterns. In all metro areas during the 1970s, African Americans moved in large numbers into white neighborhoods; moreover, black movers broke out, to at least some degree, from the “blockbusting” cycle; more of their moves were to white neighborhoods not adjacent to

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41. Calculations were conducted by Yana Kucheva and the author from restricted census data. The major northern MSAs include New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Buffalo. The “desegregating” MSAs include Seattle, San Diego, Nashville, San Antonio, Tucson, Portland (Oregon), Oklahoma City, and Salt Lake City.

42. See infra Table 2.

43. See infra Table 2.

44. Calculations were conducted by the author.

45. See, e.g., MARIA KRYSAN & KYLIE CROWDER, CYCLE OF SEGREGATION (2017) (detailing perspective on persistence of residential segregation in older metropolitan areas).
existing black communities. In other words, black in-migration became less concentrated in a few neighborhoods, and more dispersed into many. But—and this is the crucial point—the degree of this dispersion varied dramatically across metropolitan areas. In some areas, such as Chicago, 80% of African American moves in the 1970s were concentrated in a relative small number of border neighborhoods. Virtually all of these neighborhoods eventually resegregated. In other areas, such as San Diego, 80% of African American moves were dispersed across many dozens of neighborhoods. Many of these neighborhoods evolved into stably integrated communities, and virtually none of them resegregated.

Table 2. Patterns of Desegregation in the 1970s Across United States Metropolitan Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td>−0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>−0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>−0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>−0.057</td>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>−0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>−0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>−0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>−0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.747</td>
<td>−0.187</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>−0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>−0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>−0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>−0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>−0.112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46. See supra notes 5–7, 29–33 and accompanying text.
47. See Sander et al., supra note 2, at 305.
48. See id. at 181, 182 fig. 72.
49. See id. at 181.
50. See id. at 177–79.
51. See id. at 191.
In short, I argue that sharp declines in housing discrimination during the 1970s stimulated more black migration to white neighborhoods and made it possible for African American pioneers to move over a much wider, dispersed range of neighborhoods. Where black pioneering was highly dispersed, metro areas experienced significant declines in segregation. But where black pioneering was only a little more dispersed compared to the “blockbusting” days of the 1950s and 1960s, the high volume of black in-migration into a small number of neighborhoods tended to produce resegregation in those neighborhoods, and thus only small declines in metropolitan segregation.

Where desegregation did occur, the integration that resulted certainly appeared to be real. Large drops in black-white dissimilarity in the 1970s tended to be followed by further drops in the 1980s and 1990s, as Figure 2 suggests.\textsuperscript{53} Table 3, below, shows the distribution of census tracts and black residency across different neighborhoods in 1970, 1980, and 1990, for eight of the sixty metro areas that had especially large drops in segregation. A key point here is that “stable integration” did not mean that blacks could be present in only miniscule numbers; in these metro areas, most African Americans by 1990 lived in neighborhoods between 5% and 50% African American and those neighborhoods showed no tendency to resegregate over time.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See supra Figure 2.
\item See infra Table 3.
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Table 3. Black Distribution Across Census Tracts in Eight Metropolitan Areas, 1970–1990 (Las Vegas, Minneapolis, Oklahoma City, Portland, San Antonio, San Diego, Seattle, and Tucson)\textsuperscript{55}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black Presence</th>
<th>Number of Tracts</th>
<th>% of Black Population in Such Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;.5%</td>
<td>2340</td>
<td>1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.5%–5%</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%–15%</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%–35%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35%–50%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%–100%</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3494</td>
<td>3572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, by the 1990s, social scientists noticed that metro areas with lower housing segregation were showing a wide variety of better outcomes for African Americans, and these outcomes were improving over time.\textsuperscript{56} School segregation levels in these urban areas consistently fell in tandem with housing desegregation, and the percentage of whites sending their children to public schools tended to increase.\textsuperscript{57} Black test scores, incomes, and marriage rates went up; black unemployment, poverty, and even death rates went down.\textsuperscript{58} Many analysts are now convinced that housing integration is a uniquely powerful engine for reducing other forms of racial inequality.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55}. Author’s calculations conducted based on data from the Neighborhood Change Database, supra note 5, using 2010 census tract boundaries.

\textsuperscript{56}. For a pathbreaking analysis in this field, see David Cutler & Edward Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. Econ. 827 (1997). The broader literature is summarized in Sander et al., supra note 2, at 38–40.

\textsuperscript{57}. Sander et al., supra note 2, at 38–40.

\textsuperscript{58}. See generally id. at chs. 16–17 (discussing effects housing desegregation had on a variety of factors, such as marriage, income, and schooling).

\textsuperscript{59}. See id. at 407–08.
B. Explaining Desegregation in the 1970s and 1980s

If dispersed black pioneering in the 1970s and 1980s was the key to stable integration emerging at a metropolitan level, this raises another question: what factors caused dispersed pioneering?

As I note in the introduction, sociologist Yana Kucheva and I recently completed work that we think largely explains this phenomenon, and accounts for why it varied so much from one metro area to another. As I summarize our findings in this part, but note that this discussion, which focuses on the demographic structure of metro areas, is not essential to understand my argument about gentrification. Readers should feel free to skip ahead to the next part.

Kucheva and I argue that variation across metro areas in three key demographic factors determined the shape of black pioneering. The first and perhaps most important factor was intermetropolitan black migration. The vast migration of African Americans from the rural South to cities was tapering off by the mid-1960s. By 1970, most African Americans moving across state lines were migrating from one metropolitan area to another; these were often well-educated young people migrating to pursue job opportunities, pursue advanced degrees, or simply relocate in an urban area with a more vibrant economy. Since this was also the era when the North was starting to lose industrial jobs, and the Sun Belt economies in the South and West were booming, much of migration flowed to Southern and Western metro areas. In the era of declining housing discrimination after 1970, these intermetropolitan black movers were exceptionally likely to pioneer in heavily white communities far from existing black districts. A large volume of these “intermetropolitan pioneers” was, invariably, a strong catalyst for opening

60. See id. atchs. 6–7. Empirical claims in the next five paragraphs are documented in this article.
61. See id. at 171.
62. See id. at 171–72.
63. See Sander et al., supra note 2, at 140, 188–89; see also id. at 239 (explaining the loss of industrial jobs in the Northeast); John Iceland et al., Sun Belt Rising: Regional Population Change and the Decline in Black Residential Segregation, 1970–2009, 50 Demography 97, 98 (2013) (describing the industrial boom in the Sun Belt and its effects during the 1970s).
64. See Sander et al., supra note 2, at 168, 188.
new neighborhoods to black entry and greasing the wheels of desegregation.\(^6^5\) This proved to be a major reason why the South, where white attitudes were slower to favor fair housing, nonetheless experienced much more suburban integration in the 1970s than comparable Northern cities.\(^6^6\) It also helped explain why an area like San Diego experienced dramatically more desegregation in the 1970s than a place like Chicago.\(^6^7\) Over the 1970–1980 period, intermetropolitan African American movers came to make up a third of San Diego’s black population, but only 4% to 5% of Chicago’s.\(^6^8\)

A second important factor shaping the “concentration versus dispersion” of black pioneering in the 1970s was the presence or absence of white ethnic neighborhoods on the borders of black districts. Particularly in the North and Northeast, neighborhoods with a large presence of first- or second-generation European immigrants often bordered black neighborhoods.\(^6^9\) These “white ethnic” communities often had significant neighborhood institutions (churches, shops, parochial schools), a strong sense of identity, and a fear that African Americans would displace them wholesale if they gained a foothold in the neighborhood.\(^7^0\) Their resistance to that entry was often raw, violent, and organized.\(^7^1\) Black pioneers in the 1970s logically tended to avoid pioneering there\(^7^2\)—with the result that pioneer moves were concentrated in a smaller number of border neighborhoods (often those with a less strong sense of identity or more liberal values), and this concentration fed the somewhat self-fulfilling patterns of resegregation.\(^7^3\) This factor

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65. Id. at 211.
66. See id. at 174 & tbl. 7.3, 188–89.
67. See id. at 185–88.
68. See id. at 180–81.
69. See id. at 185–87.
70. See id. at 114. Three good ethnographic accounts of this phenomenon are JONATHAN REIDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN AGAINST LIBERALISM (1985); AMANDA I. SELIGMAN, BLOCK BY BLOCK: NEIGHBORHOODS AND PUBLIC POLICY ON CHICAGO’S WEST SIDE (Univ. of Chi. Press 2005); and W. EDWARD OSSE, BLOCKBUSTING IN BALTIMORE: THE EDMONSON VILLAGE STORY (Univ. Press of Ky. 1994).
71. See SANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 114–15.
73. See SANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 114, 127.
helped explain why, within the North, white-to-black resegregation in the 1970s happened less in places like Columbus and Minneapolis (which had fewer “ethnic” communities) and more in places like Cleveland and Milwaukee (which had many such communities).

The third factor we identified—one which other social scientists have noted as well—\(^7^4\) is the relative size of the black population. It is to some extent intuitively obvious that if a more dispersed black migration in the 1970s was the key to lasting integration, then this is more likely to happen in urban areas where the black population is a smaller rather than a larger share of the total population.\(^7^5\) As a matter of geometry, the ratio of “border” neighborhoods to “core” neighborhoods will be greater when core areas are smaller—so the number of border neighborhoods per thousand black residents will tend to be larger. And a smaller black population means that potential black demand following black pioneers is likely to be smaller in absolute terms. It is also the case that African Americans in metro areas where they constitute a smaller share of the total population tend to have higher exposure to whites—that is, they live closer to white populations and have more interaction with them.\(^7^6\) This plausibly means, for example, that information networks are likely to be somewhat less segregated in such urban areas, and blacks may therefore know more about housing opportunities in outlying neighborhoods. Whatever the exact mechanisms, the association is clear, and this is a key factor explaining why many Western urban areas—where African Americans were and are often less than 10% of the metro population—desegregated more in the 1970s than southern metro areas.

These three factors correlate highly (at the metropolitan level) with the degree to which black pioneering in the 1970s was concentrated or dispersed, and with rates of neighborhood resegregation. The three factors also account for 90% of the variation in how much black-white dissimilarity indices declined, at the metro level, during the 1970s. This is an unusually high level of explanatory power in any social science analysis.

\(^7^5\) See id.
\(^7^6\) Cf. id. at 820.
Similar patterns obtained in the 1980s, but with diminished force. In the most segregated urban areas, large-scale resegregation had created a new type of dual housing market, where black prices were generally lower than those in the white market. This took wind out of the sails of black pioneers. They may have also been deterred by the frequency with which pioneering led to resegregation rather than integration. By the 1990s, the vast wave of black movement out of segregated neighborhoods into white ones was largely a spent force. No urban area that had not achieved significant desegregation by 1980 was able to “join the club” of desegregated areas in the 1990s or early 2000s. The vast wave of black pioneering in the 1970s was, in that sense, a unique opportunity.

C. Drawing Some Morals from the 1970s Experience

In this account, the 1970s were an era of great progress in fair housing, with discrimination rates falling, many suburbs opened up, and the beginning of real housing desegregation in some metro areas. But it is hard not to also see it as an era of tremendous missed opportunities. The demographic energy and hope represented by the vast scale of black pioneering could have fueled much broader integration, and perhaps started nearly all of our major urban areas down the path of meaningful metropolitan desegregation. The key would have been a broader pattern of dispersed black pioneering.

In our account of what drove concentrated versus dispersed pioneering, we have emphasized the structural forces in metro areas that shaped patterns—things like the rate of intermetropolitan migration, or the extent of white ethnic enclaves. But policy clearly mattered in the 1970s, too, since the FHA appears to have played a key role in setting things in motion. It is not hard to imagine other policies that could have fostered more dispersed black pioneering. Housing counseling services could have made it much easier for African Americans to identify ownership or rental opportunities in unfamiliar white neighborhoods. Mortgage or rental

77. Cf. SANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 221–22.
78. See supra Figure 2; see also SANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 174–85, 196 (comparing dramatic desegregation in San Diego with modest desegregation in Chicago from 1970 to subsequent decades).
subsidies could have encouraged prointegrative moves. Both strategies were used on small, local scales with considerable success. 79

A critical ingredient lacking in the 1970s was any clear understanding of how the dynamics of segregation might evolve if housing discrimination rates fell, or a clear vision of how widespread integration might occur. Leaders like Walter Mondale seemed to assume that lower discrimination would automatically ignite broadly dispersed patterns of black migration 80—just as Gunnar Myrdal, decades earlier, had made a similar prediction about the consequences of Shelley v. Kraemer. 81 Better data about year-by-year changes, more focused and careful social science research, and a better pipeline of feedback from the community experiences of those experiencing both resegregation and stable integration, would have all helped tremendously. But it was crucial, as a starting point, for leaders to ask the right questions.

To put this differently, the vast but somewhat fleeting engine of black pioneering created a great opportunity for widespread integration in the 1970s—an opportunity we largely ignored. Can we do better in the twenty-first century?

III. THE NEW URBAN MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

A. “Gentrification” Is One Facet of a Broader Phenomenon

America’s metropolitan areas are dynamic places. We have had dramatic booms and busts during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, some of them national and some regional. Urban areas have experienced steady demographic change over the


81. Gunnar Myrdal predicted in his classic work on American race relations, An American Dilemma, that a successful attack on restrictive covenants would “nearly doom[]” housing segregation in the North. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 624 (1944).
past generation through several different sorts of three important migrations. One is the growth in the Hispanic and Asian American presence in many urban areas. These groups have not only grown in absolute numbers, but they have diffused nationally, so that, for example, the Hispanic population in metropolitan Atlanta has grown by a factor of eight since 1990, and the Asian American population in metropolitan Minneapolis has grown by a factor of three.\textsuperscript{82} Relatedly, international migration to American urban areas has boomed since 1990, with immigrants from Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe setting in substantial numbers in many metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{83} In part because of these migrations, central cities that were losing population at a high rate in the 1970s and 1980s have had stable or growing populations in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{84}

But the “new” urban migration that I focus upon here, and which justifiably captures a lot of attention, is the movement of Anglos and middle-class minorities into dense urban neighborhoods that, until recently, were predominantly low-income and black or Hispanic. As we have discussed, debates rage about whether this migration is producing mostly good, or mostly bad results. As I show below, there is no doubt that the traditional pattern of middle-class families moving ever-further outward from urban cores has changed fundamentally. The new urban migration is very real.

This migration has some obvious benefits. To the extent that it reduces the concentrations of affluence in suburbs and poverty in central cities, it improves the fiscal health of the latter and promotes the long-term vitality of urban centers. Since most of the immigrants work in the urban core, their movement towards the core helps to reduce commuting times, traffic congestion, and the pollution congestion generates.

Gentrification also has the obvious potential to be pro-integrative. White and/or affluent minority pioneers are bringing racial and economic diversity to the neighborhoods they enter, just as black pioneers entering white neighborhoods have in the past. But


\textsuperscript{83} See Sander ET AL., supra note 2, 364–65; see also U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, supra note 82, § 1, at 11–13, 52; PROQUEST LLC, supra note 82, at 27, 38, 46.

\textsuperscript{84} See Sander ET AL., supra note 2, 364–65.
a key question—and one with an obvious analogy to the 1970s—is whether the new pioneering leads to stable integration, or whether it is a prelude to neighborhood transition and resegregation?

For me, the short answer is that there is reason for optimism, but not complacency. The evidence suggests that gentrification has thus far usually led to integration, and has produced more benefits than harms in the core areas where it has occurred. But there are three significant dangers. One is that gentrification is occurring at a far more rapid pace in some places than others, and where it is occurring rapidly, resegregation is a much more likely outcome. A second concern is that even where gentrification is moderate and gradual, it tends to raise housing costs. Though this may occur slowly enough to not directly displace a large number of tenants, the end result is nonetheless a reduction in the economic and racial diversity that could be achieved by careful interventions. A third concern is that the instances where gentrification does produce re-segregation and massive displacement can generate strong political reactions that shut down or discourage gentrification broadly, thus forfeiting its potential benefits.

Before we can really consider how best to balance the benefits and dangers of the new urban migration, we need to better comprehend its scale and manifestations. That is the goal of the next part.

B. The New Urban Migration at the Macro and Micro Level

To understand what is happening at the macro level, it is useful to divide the census tracts of metropolitan areas into four quartiles, with the first quartile representing the one-quarter of all tracts in a given metro area that have the lowest population per square mile, the second quartile representing the quarter of tracts with the next-lowest population per square mile, and so on. Using these density quartiles, which are calculated for each metropolitan area in each decade, allows us to provide a more standardized measure of change than, for example, comparing central cities and suburbs.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{85} The city/suburb distinction has become steadily less useful as a way of thinking about national patterns of urban change and residence. In some metro areas, the central city accounts for less than a sixth of the metro population (e.g., Atlanta, San Francisco, and the District of Columbia), while in others it accounts for 80%. Compare U.S. Census Bureau,
Table 4 shows how the racial makeup of the four quartiles changed over the forty years from 1970 to 2010. There are several interesting stories in this data, but a striking one for present purposes is the trend in the “densest” quartile, where most gentrification has presumably happened. Through 2010, the net effect of this migration was to halt what, in the 1970–1990 period, was a fairly dramatic decline in white populations in dense areas. In this data, there is no sign yet of the “flipping” some have predicted, where whites will dominate core areas and African Americans will be displaced into suburbia.

Table 4. Distribution of Anglos and Black by Metropolitan Density Quartile, 1970–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Density Quartile</th>
<th>Share of Residents Anglo in:</th>
<th>Share of Residents Black in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Least (1)</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less (2)</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More (3)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most (4)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 uses a similar methodology to examine household income levels. Here again, we see a dramatic shift in incomes during the 1970–1990 period, with dense areas becoming poorer and the least dense areas becoming richer. Over the 1990–2010 period,

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Yana Kucheva and I calculated density quartiles using the NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE DATABASE, supra note 5. For each of twenty-five major metropolitan areas over five decennial census years (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010), we calculated the population per square mile in each census tract (census tracts are small neighborhood-sized areas of typically around four thousand residents). The database maintains the comparability of census tracts over time, and we held metropolitan boundaries constant at their 1980 borders. We then sorted tracts within each metropolitan area, for each census year, into four quartiles, based on population density, and calculated the statistics shown in Tables 4 and 5 for the tracts in each quartile.

86. Calculations conducted by the author using data from the NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE DATABASE, supra note 5.
these patterns largely stabilize, with dense areas gaining back a little of their losses but remaining by far the least affluent quartile.

Table 5. Average Household Incomes Across the Density Gradient, Twenty-Five Major Metro Areas, 1990–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Density Quartile</th>
<th>Average Household Income as % of Overall Average, by Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least (1)</td>
<td>108%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less (2)</td>
<td>109%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More (3)</td>
<td>102%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most (4)</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both of these tables support a subtle but important generalization about the new urban migration, and about gentrification specifically. There is an historic tendency in the United States for older neighborhoods to gradually, sometimes imperceptibly, slip in socioeconomic status as the housing stock ages and middle-class residents gradually move on to newer developments. Gentrification, in contrast, is often highly visible, accompanied by new construction or the gutting and dramatic rehabilitation of older properties. This means that by its very nature, gentrification tends to get more attention, and one might feel that a neighborhood is gentrifying even if splashy rehabs and new construction merely offset more subtle housing decline and abandonment.

The migration of whites and more generally middle-class families back to the “center” of urban areas has, in the aggregate, so far simply stopped the generations-long pattern of falling central city populations and relative economic decline in dense areas relative to the outlying suburbs. This is not a trivial thing; a huge demographic ship steaming in the suburban direction has, in effect, turned around. A crucial question—and hard to answer as of yet—is whether the ship will start accelerating back towards the urban core, or whether it will simply rest in equipoise.

Anyway, that is an “aggregate” story; just as important is understanding what is happening at the neighborhood level. The fact

87. Calculations conducted by the author using data from the Neighborhood Change Database, supra note 5.
88. Observing this point explicitly is often considered politically taboo, since the idea of a linear neighborhood decline can be improperly taken to imply an inevitability to the process. But the general tendency is easy to demonstrate empirically for nearly any twentieth century American urban area. See, e.g., Kenneth Temkin & William Rohe, Neighborhood Change and Urban Policy, 15 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 159, 159–61 (1996).
89. See supra Table 4.
that many urban areas have, on an aggregate level, stabilized in
terms of racial and income composition can and does conceal a vast
amount of change in many directions at the neighborhood level.

One of the most helpful current tools for understanding neigh-
borhood change over time is the GeoLytics Neighborhood Change
Database (“GNCD”). In addition to counting the American popu-
lation, the Bureau of the Census regularly gathers more detailed
demographic data on a subset of the population, and releases this
data for census tracts. (A “census tract” is a contiguous, neigh-
borhood-sized area, typically comprising about four thousand resi-
dents.) In the late twentieth century, the Census released census
tract data as part of each decennial census; now the Census collects
such data annually but, for sample size and confidentiality rea-
sons, releases this data at the census tract data only in five-year
increments. GeoLytics matches census tracts over time and, where
the Census Bureau has changed tract boundaries, uses various al-
gorithms to create constant and reasonably comparable tracts over
time. The GNCD can thus allow us to measure how demographics
at the tract—i.e., neighborhood—level have changed over time.

To begin, let us consider a question that is often discussed in
vague terms: how large is the migration of Anglos to neighborhoods
where they are “replacing” racial minorities?

In the GNCD, about 73,000 census tracts comprise metropolitan
America in 2000. Of these, we are interested in tracts which: (a)
experienced at least a de minimus (i.e., more than fifty) increase in
Anglo population between 2000 and 2011–2015, (b) experienced an
increase in the percentage of population that was Anglo, and (c)
did not have a dramatic increase in the total housing stock (thus
excluding suburban fringe areas or areas of new construction on
vacant land). With these restrictions, we are left with about 5500
census tracts which collectively experienced an increase of 1.8 mil-
lion Anglos.

90. The attentive reader will have noticed that I have used the GNCD for a number of
the neighborhood-level analyses already discussed. See supra notes 5, 35, 85 and accompa-
nying text; supra Tables 3–5.

91. Neighborhood Change Database [NCDB] Tract Data from 1970–2010, GeoLYTICS,

92. See Neighborhood Change Database, supra note 5.
To put this number in perspective, it is helpful to consider a couple of comparisons. For example, if we apply the same metrics to the 1970–1980 period, we tally a migration of 1.5 million Anglos into areas where the nonwhite population is in relative decline. The numbers are strikingly similar across the decades, but the key motive process involved is very different. In the 1970s, white suburbs often engulfed and effectively displaced rural black communities in the South and sometimes elsewhere.

These white migrations, though large, were smaller than the African American urban migration of the 1970s. If we use the same metrics to compare “black to nonblack” neighborhood migration with “white to nonwhite” neighborhood migration, we tally over 4.2 million African Americans moving into some 9800 census tracts over the ten years from 1970 to 1980. Both the black pioneering of the 1970s, and the white pioneering that has occurred since 2000, represent major demographic events.

We tend to think of gentrification as highly concentrated; once affluent households or whites see a neighborhood “coming back,” the notion goes, they pour into a community and thoroughly “yupify” it. This supposition is behind the fear that largely white-led gentrification will tend to lead to neighborhood resegregation. This does happen sometimes, but the tract-level data suggests that it is comparatively rare. Over the 2000–2013 period, the typical change in white presence in these tracts amounted to about 5% to 10% of the total tract population. In only 334 tracts nationwide did the white percentage rise as much as twenty points, and in only thirty-four did it rise as much as forty points.

93. See id.
94. See also Lance Freeman & Tiancheng Cai, White Entry into Black Neighborhoods: Advent of a New Era?, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 302, 305, 307 (2015) (showing that the rate of white migration into black neighborhoods was roughly twice as high in the 2000s as in the 1980s or 1990s); Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Has Falling Crime Invited Gentrification? (Working Paper No. CES 17, 2017) (arguing that the drop in crime in the 1990s and 2000s was an important spur to the new urban migration).
95. As Neil Smith has observed, “Gentrification can be seen as a simple class (and sometimes race) retaking of the city, but it has a much broader significance. It simultaneously involves a certain economic excommunication of working class people from their communities.” THE GENTRIFICATION READER, supra note 1, at xi.
Table 6. Change in Tract % White, 2000–2013. Change in tract % white in the universe of census tracts that (a) experienced a net increase of at least 50 whites, (b) a rise in the percentage of whites in the population, and (c) less than a 1000-person increase in overall tract population, 2000–2013.96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Tract % White</th>
<th>Number (and %) of Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 10%</td>
<td>4209 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%-20%</td>
<td>802 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%-40%</td>
<td>300 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%-60%</td>
<td>32 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60%</td>
<td>2 (~0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tracts satisfying conditions</td>
<td>5345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tracts in metro United States</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is very good news; it means that white migration into nonwhite areas is relatively dispersed. To be sure, the African American presence in neighborhoods undergoing white influx usually falls; this is inevitable unless the total number of units simultaneously increases. But the declines in black population are also relatively small and incremental.

This general picture—that gentrification is often producing integration, and rarely producing resegregation—accords with what other scholars have found when they analyze gentrification in a systematic way. In one of the most sophisticated analyses to date, Ingrid Gould Ellen and Gerard Torrats-Espinosa use the GNCD to measure the incidence and demographic path of gentrification in a variety of ways.97 In one analysis, they examined the 3491 tracts nationwide in 1980 that were low-income, in central cities, and were predominantly (over 75%) nonwhite.98 Of these tracts, 153 “gentrified” in the 1980s, which by their definition meant that the median income of the tract rose at least 10% relative to the metropolitan median.99 A generation later, measured by the census ACS over the period 2012–2016, 6 of these 153 tracts had become predominantly white (i.e., over 75% non-Hispanic white).100 Forty-

96. Numbers based on the author’s analysis of the Neighborhood Change Database, supra note 5.
98. Id. at 5 tbl. 2.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 5 tbl. 2, 9 tbl. 6.
seven tracts (almost a third) had become “integrated”—i.e., between one-quarter and three-quarters white.\textsuperscript{101} Two-thirds of the tracts had remained predominantly nonwhite.\textsuperscript{102} In other words, resegregation (a minority-to-white transition) was quite uncommon, and when the white presence increased, the long-term outcome was very likely to be an integrated community rather than a predominantly white one. Still, Ellen and Torrats-Espinosa are cautious: they note that in the post-2000 era, gentrification is both more common and more often accompanied by a substantial rate of white in-migration.\textsuperscript{103}

Here again, it is worth noting the contrast between the 2000–2013 white migration to nonwhite areas, and the 1970–1980 migration of African Americans to white areas. Nearly 2000 tracts in the 1970s experienced a one-decade increase of 20 percentage points or more in the African American presence during the 1970s; more than 600 experienced an increase of more than 40 percentage points.\textsuperscript{104} Almost always this meant a concomitant decrease in the white presence, and in many cases this change was completing or beginning a process of full resegregation.

\begin{footnotes}
101. Id. at 2, 5 tbl. 2, 9 tbl. 6.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 14.
104. See infra Table 7.
\end{footnotes}
Table 7. Change in Tract % Black, 1970–1980. Change in track % black in the universe of census tracts that: (a) experienced a net increase of at least 50 blacks, (b) a rise in the percentage of blacks in the population, and (c) less than a 1000-person increase in overall tract population, 1970–1980.105

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Tract % Black</th>
<th>Number (and %) of Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 10%</td>
<td>6433 (65.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%–20%</td>
<td>1488 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%–40%</td>
<td>1195 (12.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%–60%</td>
<td>444 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60%</td>
<td>213 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tracts satisfying conditions</td>
<td>9783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tracts in metro United States, 1970</td>
<td>45,237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparing Tables 6 and 7, we can see that dramatic black-to-white racial change at the neighborhood level was much more common in the 1970s than nonwhite-to-white change has been in the longer period from 2000 to 2013. By any measure we choose, the current wave of back-to-the-city migration is more regularly producing integration and contributing to diversity than did the African American migration of the 1970s.

Housing costs do increase when white entry has occurred— but here too, the effects are typically modest. The tracts in Table 6—that is, urban tracts where net white in-migration is occurring—experienced rental increases from the 2000 to 2013 only about 10% higher than those in all other tracts.106 There are cases where the effects are much more dramatic, but crucially, the stereotypical view that gentrification produces dramatic change is the exception in the new urban migration, not the rule.

**IV. WHAT DO THESE PATTERNS IMPLY ABOUT POLICY?**

Although my sketch of demographic trends has been brief, I think it suggests several key points which are borne out by longer analyses in the literature. First, let me reiterate a key takeaway from the first half of this essay: the great African American migration into white communities that followed the FHA represents a missed opportunity. Where black migration was even moderately dispersed, integration happened, endured, and produced in time

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105. Numbers are based on the author’s analysis of the Neighborhood Change Database, supra note 5.
106. Numbers are based on the author's analysis of the Neighborhood Change Database, supra note 5.
remarkable gains in socioeconomic black outcomes. But more often, black migration in the 1970s was highly concentrated, producing resegregation at the neighborhood level and continuing metropolitan segregation in most of America’s largest urban areas. Had public policy made even gentle attempts to encourage more dispersed black migration, we might have broken cycles of segregation in many more cities and fundamentally changed patterns of persistent racial inequality.

We can see, second, that white migration to nonwhite areas has thus far proceeded in a more hopeful way. While there are obvious instances of gentrification-as-resegregation, the national patterns suggest that white migration has generally been quite dispersed, increasing integration and bringing to a halt the relative decline of dense areas in both population and household income. So far, the new urban migration has been predominantly a good thing for both central cities and the cause of integration, and it deserves to be cautiously celebrated as such.

There is reason to be concerned, however, that harmful consequences from gentrification have increased in the past few years, and could increase further in the years ahead. Anecdotal stories of dramatic neighborhood change abound, and concerns about escalating rents have become a staple of urban conversation. More importantly, all of the objective analyses of gentrification patterns show an acceleration of the pace and scale of the new urban migration in recent years.107 This is therefore a time to be particularly vigilant in monitoring demographic patterns, and to develop constructive policy interventions that can maximize the integration impact of the new urban migration.

Several types of intervention make eminent sense. First, as Lance Freeman108 and others have argued, housing trusts are a promising way to preserve both racial and economic diversity in gentrifying neighborhoods. The trust idea can take many forms, but a simple version is to use a revolving fund to: (a) buy low-rent housing in areas starting to experience gentrification, (b) insert restrictions in property’s deed limiting rent increases over the medium term (e.g., fifteen to twenty years), and (c) resell the property

107. See supra Table 4.
to the private market. An intervention of this type is very inexpensive compared to most other subsidized housing strategies; the capital used can be recycled over and over; and putting a significant share of housing in a neighborhood into trusts places a ceiling on gentrification and thus intrinsically tends to disperse gentrifying migrants.

Second, cities can be proactive in making neighborhoods experiencing gentrification succeed as models of integration.¹⁰⁹ Suppose that the city government identifies a gentrifying neighborhood, and places a moderate supplemental property tax on the appreciation of properties in that neighborhood that exceeds city averages. The tax not only helps to disperse gentrification (i.e., by encouraging gentrifying migrants to locate in nearby, untaxed neighborhoods), but also provides a financing stream to make neighborhood integration “work”—by investing in local public schools, by subsidizing services helpful to existing residents, by supporting community institutions and culture, and related steps that make a neighborhood “integrated” not just formally, but in residents’ everyday lives.

Third, local government can help to disperse gentrification by making it easier for rehabilitation and development to happen in neighborhoods that are plausible sites of gentrification (e.g., by their proximity to gentrifying neighborhoods) but have not yet experienced it.

Adopting policies like these, which think about long-term integration goals and the well-being of all economic and racial groups in cities, requires good data, careful monitoring, and clear thresholds to determine when to deploy particular strategies. Research in the field, I think, has not quite progressed to the point where such thresholds can be set. But certainly some key ingredients are these: (a) How rapidly are housing costs going up in a neighborhood, relative to the metro area as a whole? (b) Is there a legitimate concern that most of the low-income housing in the neighborhood could disappear? (c) What are reasonable economic and integration goals for a neighborhood ten years from now?

Improving and testing our ability to predict where gentrification happens, and where its consequences are likely to be benign or

¹⁰⁹. See, e.g., Diane Levy et al., In the Face of Gentrification: Case Studies of Local Efforts to Mitigate Displacement, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 238, 238 (2006).
harmful, is a crucial part of making the new urban migration a success.\textsuperscript{110}

V. FAIR HOUSING AND COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE

Where does fair housing fit into this picture? As Professor Johnson points out in this issue, most fair housing tools are better suited to the task of \textit{gaining} access for minorities to excluding neighborhoods than \textit{maintaining} access to neighborhoods undergoing gentrification.\textsuperscript{111} This toolkit has become larger with the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Inclusive Communities},\textsuperscript{112} validating the soundness of disparate impact litigation to prevent public and private actions that disproportionately exclude protected groups. Still, a fair housing lawsuit is at best a slow and clumsy way to bring about the sort of positive vision of gentrification I outlined in the last section.

The FHA required federal agencies to “affirmatively further” fair housing, and since the 1970s this requirement has applied as well to local governments that receive federal housing and community grants.\textsuperscript{113} For decades, the requirement imposed few meaningful constraints on government action, other than requiring some sort of effort to address housing discrimination. In 2015, the Obama Administration introduced new rules to make the “AFFH” process push local governments towards at least thinking about housing desegregation in a serious way.\textsuperscript{114} Secretary Carson suspended implementation of the rule, and the suspension has been challenged in court, so the current status of AFFH is in flux.\textsuperscript{115} But over the

\textsuperscript{110} There is an increasing focus of research on gentrification. \textit{See}, e.g., Ellen & Torrats-Espinosa supra note 97; work presented by Lance Freeman at the Richmond Symposium.


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{See} Kriston Capps, \textit{The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key Obama Rule on
medium term, it seems very likely that cities and counties will pay more attention to the problem of intense segregation and opportunities for housing integration.

Professor Johnson’s article makes a compelling case, I believe, for weaving fair housing tools into a broader strategy for neighborhood justice. Gauging the disparate impact of public policies, and the possible fair housing violations of developers, are ways of creating accountability.\textsuperscript{116} For her, as for me, the key is for fair housing advocates to work with neighborhood residents to develop democratic, inclusive, and positive plans for where neighborhoods should be headed, and how to observe and capture the opportunities created by the new urban migration.\textsuperscript{117}

CONCLUSION

For reasons I have explained, the contemporary gentrification scene should be front and center when planners and officials are thinking about integration. This is where much of the “demographic energy” in urban America is concentrated, and there is thus tremendous opportunity to adjust and direct this energy in ways that facilitate broad economic and racial integration rather than resegregation.

Local governments can achieve massive “win-wins” if they approach this subject with the right sensitivities. Proactive strategies to disperse gentrification and promote successful and inclusive integration are not only good for the economic and demographic health of cities; they are also smart politically. By involving communities in the planning process, officials can both better understand the ingredients of successful integration and head off the type of litigation and opposition that can freeze all change, good or bad. It is crucial, however, that officials understand the underlying demographic facts are and have a positive vision. Otherwise, a re-

\textsuperscript{116} Johnson, \textit{supra} note 111, at 835.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 861, 869.
flexive community fear of any change can become the driving narrative. We should not let contemporary urban communities have a veto on all change; the original FHA was all about taking away the veto of communities to prevent racial and demographic change. Channeling the fear of change into constructive and positive strategies can be accomplished by a strong understanding of the broader demographics of gentrification and clear positive examples of how successful urban integration is achieved.